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The EU Means Business:
A Survey of Legal Challenges and Opportunities
in the New Europe*
Eric Engle**
I. INTRODUCTION
A single market from Brest to the Bering straights; An entire conti-
nent working in peaceful harmony toward the greater prosperity of
all. This vision of Europe, at once practical in means and sweeping in
scope, has driven the economies of Western Europe forward since 30
years. Now it is poised to drive the economies of Eastern Europe for-
ward as well. One can look on this engine of growth and prosperity
with hope or fear. But one cannot ignore it.
The single market in Europe has grown gradually and pragmatically
over time. The thesis this article presents is just as practical. As others
have also argued,1 a number of EC Directives, regulations and cases
together create a common European business law. This article surveys
and outlines that law. All of the various efforts at harmonization this
law embodies work toward creating a single integrated European mar-
ket in order to garner the benefits of improved competition and syner-
gies. Economic synergy is no idealist pipe dream. In materialist terms,
economies of scale, 2 specialization 3 at each stage of production, stand-
ardization of parts and services4 and trade itself,5 all result in a whole
* "New Europe" does not mean only Eastern Europe, though the greatest potential for
growth in the EU is in Eastern Europe. Rather, it is Europe of 25 doing business under one
common framework established by the Union.
** Professor of law at the University of Tartu, Estonia.
1. See Andrea J. Gildea, Uberseering: A European Company Passport, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
25, 292 (2004). "Presently, a hybrid system of recognition exists in Europe. It consists of national
rules, EC rules, and a somewhat substantial zone of ambiguity between the two regimes." Id.
2. Economies of Scale, at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/economiesofscale.asp (last vis-
ited Mar. 30, 2006). "The increase in efficiency of production as the number of goods being
produced increases. Typically, a company that achieves economies of scale lowers the average
cost per unit through increased production since fixed costs are shared over an increased number
of goods." Id.
3. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
CH. 1, PARA. 3 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776) (noting an example of increased pro-
duction in a pin factory due to specialization).
4. See, e.g., "Eli Whitney" at http://www.answers.com/topic/eli-whitney (last visited Mar. 30,
2006).
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that is in real terms far wealthier than the sum of its parts. Synergies
resulting from European integration are estimated to bring at least an
additional five billion euros of wealth to the European economy.6
These economic facts have political implications. This article uses
them to partially test a much larger hypothesis: The EU does not re-
present a misguided effort at neo-mercantilism. ASEAN,
MERCOSUR, NAFTA and the EU are not competing continental
empires doomed like the empires of 1914 and 1940 to mutual destruc-
tion because they are part of a global liberal trading regime under the
aegis of the WTO.7 Rather, the economic policies of the European
Community (Community), like those of the other mentioned inter-
state organizations, are founded on the presumptions of classical eco-
nomic liberalism: That individuals should be able to make their own
choices,8 that open markets are economically optimal, 9 that the state
has a limited role as market regulator 10 and that trade encourages
peace and prosperity" because it is a positive sum game 12 - even in
cases where trading parties are asymmetric and one has an absolute
advantage in production of all goods. 13 These assumptions propelled
America from wilderness to world power and have preserved peace
since 1945. Rather than recreate the failed imperialist models of the
past, the very object of the EU, the WTO, and the Bretton Woods
institutions 14 is to sever the link between territorial control and mar-
5. See 4 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS CH. 2, PARA. 15 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776) (discussing restraints upon
importation from foreign countries of goods that can be produced at home).
6. See Gildea, supra note 1 at 258.
7. See Eric Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: The Post- Westphalian
Legal Order, 23 QLR 23, 26 (2004).
8. Eduardo M. Pefialver, Property As Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1900-1901 n. 32(2005).
9. See generally SMITH, supra note 3; DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND TAXATION 7.13-7.16 (John Murray 1817), available at http://www.econlib.org/
library/Ricardo/ricP2a.html#Ch.7,%200n%20Foreign%20Trade (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
10. See generally, SMITH, supra note 3.
11. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott And WTO Accession: Can Foreign
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions? 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 283, 286 (2003). "[Tjhe free trade
system was designed to promote not just prosperity but peaceful and amicable relations between
Member States..." Id.
12. SMITH, supra note 3 at Ch. 1, para. 3 ( noting an example of increased production in a pin
factory due to specialization).
13. RICARDO, supra note 9, at 7.13-7.16.
14. See Debra Steger, Peace And Prosperity Through Trade, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1133,
1133 (2005).
"'Peace and prosperity through trade' was the basic objective on which the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") was founded almost sixty years ago and it remains the funda-
mental raison d'etre of the World Trade Organization ("WTO") today." Id.
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ket share which caused two world wars.15 Although the EU seeks to
create autarchy in food production, 16 it is constantly imbricated into
the liberal world trade regime of the WTO and the security regime of
NATO. Autarchy is unprofitable and the only security is collective
security.
Not only is the EU no threat to U.S. interests it is in fact an oppor-
tunity for American business. As the late President Kennedy said
"[W]e don't regard a strong, united Europe as a rival, but as a part-
ner."' 17 Europe is good for business. Even if the increased productivity
of the EU costs the U.S. relative market share in certain sectors so
what? To put the point extremely: Who cares if you lose half your
market share if at the same time you triple your income? That very
roughly is what has happened to the U.S. since 1945. A massive in-
crease in absolute wealth coupled with relative decline is the result of
trading synergies. In short, the illusion of failure (relative decline in
economic power) is built in to the reality of success (absolute increase
in real wealth resulting from the above described synergies). In fact,
the U.S. has been in relative economic decline since 1945. It has seen
its share of world production decline from nearly 50% of a planet dev-
astated by global war to just under 20% in a world of abundance.18
Does anyone seriously think that the U.S. was not in real terms much
better in 2005 than it was in 1945?19 A cursory examination of life
expectancy proves the point. Prosperity makes war irrelevant.
National security arguments against complacency in the face of rela-
tive decline ignore the obvious fact that nuclear weapons make war,
already irrelvant 20 because it destroys productive capacity, unthink-
able:21 "Conventional" war is also irrelevant. Just look at Iraq for the
15. See Eric Allen Engle, The Transformation of the International Legal System: The Post-
Westphalian Legal Order, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 23, 26 (2004).
16. See generally Alastair J. Walling, Early To Bed, Early To Rise, Work Like Hell And
Globalize, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 161, 174 (2003/2004) (discussing whether globalization is a
good thing). See also Michael J. Trebilcock, Critiquing the Critics of Economic Globalization, 1 J.
INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 213, 233-234 (2005) (noting that if each EU state "aspired to be self-
sufficient in food, this would contradict the entire European economic integreation process").
17. TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, FREE WORLD: WHY A CRISIS OF THE WEST REVEALS THE OP-
PORTUNITY OF OUR TIME, 102, 221-22. (Allen Lane ed. Random House 2004).
18. PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND
MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 352-59 (Vintage Books 1989).
19. See generally Kennedy, supra note 18.
20. Paul W. Kahn, American Hegemony And International Law Speaking Law To Power: Pop-
ular Sovereignty, Human Rights, And The New International Order, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 6 (2000).
"A strand of military analysis asserts that nuclear weapons are quite useless devices." Id.
21. See Christopher B. Stone, Signaling Behavior, Congressional-Executive Agreements, And
The Salt I Interim Agreement, 34 Geo. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 305, 305 (2002). In quoting former
President R. M. Nixon's memoirs:
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most recent example of the failure of war to advance economic policy.
Moreover, threats to the U.S. and the world today are either from
non-state actors such as insurgents 22 or from cross border environ-
mental issues.23 Conventional armies are ill adapted to meet either of
these threats. 24 From all this follows that the state-centric realpolitik
neoconservative2 5 view of the national security state is dangerous and
unrealistic because of the destructive power of nuclear weapons and
irrelevant because military power does not create economic wealth.26
An interdependant global markteplace has made the realist neocon-
servative view of the state pointless.27 There is a much richer, more
interesting and brighter world of commerce to be won.
To understand the construction of Europe as one pole in a world
order based on liberalism we need to assess the methods of its con-
struction, ontology, goals, and teleology.
A. The Ontology of the Union-Functionalism28
The ontology of the EU is pragmatic. The Union was built up grad-
ually on the basis of functionalist theory.29 Functionalism is the idea
that economic integration is best achieved not at one fell swoop with
It was clear to me by 1969 that there could never be absolute parity between the U.S.
and the U.S.S.R. in the area of nuclear and conventional armaments... [Albsolute
parity in every area of armaments would have been meaningless, because there is a
point in arms development at which each nation has the capacity to destroy the other.
Beyond that point the most important consideration is not continued escalation of the
number of arms but maintenance of the strategic equilibrium while making it clear to
the adversary that a nuclear attack, even if successful, would be suicidal.
Id. at 339.
22. Engle, supra note 15, at 34.
23. Col. Michael Wansink, Whither Sovereignty?, National Defense University Executive Re-
search Project S19, at 22,35, available at http://www.ndu.edu/library/ic6/95-S19.pdf (last visited
Mar. 30, 2006).
24. See Engle, supra note 15, at 29-30.
25. See, e.g., Project for a New American Century,:Rebuilding America's Defenses, Report of
the Project of the New American Century (2000) at http://www.newamericancentury.org/
RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
26. See Susan George, The International Geo-Economic System in HUMAN RiGrrs IN PER-
SPECrIVE 275 (Asbjorn Eide, Bernt Hagtvet, ed., Blackwell 1992) (making an incisive argument
that military power is outmoded but has been replaced by financial power which is more subtle
and effective than direct control).
27. See Engle, supra note 15, for an extended discussion of this thesis.
28. As a theory of sociology, functionalism is essentially organicist, analogizing society to an
organism, with each member having particular functions, like organs of a body. See, e.g., Kent
McClelland, Theoretical Perspectives in Sociology, Functionalism, (2000), at http://
web.grinnell.edu/courses/soc/sOO/soclll-01/IntroTheories/Functionalism.htm (last visited Mar.
30, 2006).
29. See Jos6 E. Alvarez, Steve Charnovitz, Triangulating The World Trade Organization, 96
AM. J. Ir'L L. 28, 48 (2002). "The core idea of functionalism is that international governance
should be organized according to 'tasks' and 'functional lines.'" Id.
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grandiose and impossible ideas.30 Rather, functionalism takes a prag-
matic approach: it seeks to attain the possible, here and now, rather
than the perfect, maybe someday.31 Functionalist methods obtain po-
litical legitimacy after the fact because of the success of the institution
at achieving practical goals. 32 No one complains about success.
Functionalist theory has succesfully3 3 drawn Europe from a Com-
munity of six nations jointly developing coal and steel resources into a
25 nation Union constituting the world's largest free trading area. 34
Functionalism has not however created a Federal Europe. 35 This is
because its legitimacy is always ex post. Functionalism may build an
economic union, but political union requires direct democratic input
in concert with a clear political will. This is one more reason even the
most defensive minded Americans should not fear Europe.
B. The Teleology of the Union-Liberalism
The teleology of the Union is a single market destined to create the
conditions of prosperity necessary to enable people to live what Aris-
30. Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34 AM. J. INT'L L
260, 283 (1940). Noting that grandiose legalistic schemes purporting to solve the ills of the world
have replaced the painstaking search for the actual laws and the facts underlying them). Id.
31. See Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization, International Financial
Institutions, and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 243, 264 n. 57 (2000) (quoting
BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WORLD BANK 14-
15 (Keegan Paul 1992)).
Functionalism is a theory of international organization which holds that a world com-
munity can best be achieved not by attempts at the immediate political union of states,
but by the creation of non-political international agencies dealing with specific eco-
nomic, social, technical, or humanitarian functions. Functionalists assume that eco-
nomic, social and technical problems can be separated from political problems and
insulated from political pressures.
Id. "Brown's important work has a special relevance to the current operations of the IFIs." Id.
32. "The neo-functionalist theory that has driven much of European integration, for example,
posits that supranational institutions formed for fairly narrow purposes will attract political sup-
port over time and will thereby be able to expand their functions." Ernest A. Young, The
Trouble With Global Constitutionalism, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 527, 540 n.86 (2003).
33. ". .. [Flunctionalism ... has enabled the incremental, progressive development of the
European Union."
Sabino Cassese, European Administrative Proceedings, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 21, 23 (2004).
34. Laura Dale, The Economic Impact Of Replacing The Federal Income Tax With A Federal
Consumption Tax: Leveling The International Playing Field, 9 INT'L TRADE L.J. 47, 47 (2000).
See, e.g, Myrtle D. Bishop, Samuel J. Chandle, Opportunities And Challenges: The Caribbean
Involvement In The Free Trade Area Of The Americas, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 909, 913 (2004)
(noting that the FTAA is the world's largest free trade zone). However, the FTAA is still under
construction and only comprises free trade in goods, not in labor.
35. This may be because functionalism and democratic deficit are capable of coexisting. Sec-
ondarily, as the Union expands, political integration becomes more difficult, despite the insis-
tance that new states accept the acquis communataire, the attained goals of the Union, such as
the single currency.
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totle called "the good life", 36 a life of well being, culture and fullest
development and expression of the human spirt. A certain degree of
wealth is a necessary condition to enjoying the good life, but wealth
itself is not the end of the good life.37
In practical terms, this teleology expresses itself most recently
through efforts toward privatization and deregulation.38 In the 1980s
and 1990s a consensus emerged in the west that private ownership of
the means of production was more efficient than public ownership.
Thus, state owned enterprises such as rails, telecommunications and
post offices throughout Europe have been privatized and listed on
stock exchanges. An immediate practical reason for this may be due
to budget deficits.39
The goal of economic integration is attained through harmonization
Directives, regulations and case law of the EU. EU securities regula-
tion harmonization efforts aim to remove technical barriers that cre-
ate transaction costs or prevent entry into markets to create a single
market that clears as efficiently as possible.40 This is done in order to
create an integrated securities market. The creation of a single Euro-
pean capital market is a major goal of the European project. 41 The
36. See 1 ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Part 2 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Adelaide 2004), available at
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8po/bookl.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
"When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or
quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and con-
tinuing in existence for the sake of a good life." Id.
37. 1 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS Ch. 5 (W.D.Ross trans., MIT 1994) available at
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.mb.txt (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). "The life of
money-making is one undertaken under compulsion, and wealth is evidently not the good we are
seeking; for it is merely useful and for the sake of something else." Id.
38. Manning Gilbert Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements Of
The European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 194 (1990).
39. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 12 (1999).
All over Europe, governments are attempting to foster an equity culture for both ideo-
logical and practical reasons. Government planning and ownership of industry has
fallen out of favor coincident with the collapse of Communism. In any event, ever in-
creasing budget deficits are no longer sustainable by governments. One result of this
political shift to a free market ideology coupled with a practical need to reduce govern-
ment spending has been massive privatizations of government owned assets
Id.
40. Id. at 13-14.
41. Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 2, Oct. 2, 1997, 37 I.L.M 56 (1998).
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and an eco-
nomic and monetary union and by implementing common policies or activities referred
to in Articles 3 and 4, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced
and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of
social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a
high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising
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single capital market is intended to enhance international economic
well being and to avoid economic crises. 42 Europe is an agent of stable
growth and thus is an opportunity for prosperity even for Europe's
trading partners.
With this understanding of the means and ends of the European
Union this article will now turn to the legal instruments used to attain
the single market in labor, capital, goods and services. The article's
focus will accordingly shift from grand political issues at the macro
level to the practical legal mechanisms people build on the basis of
those beliefs. Specifically, it surveys EU securities law, tax law and
company law as these are at once economically interesting and useful
vectors to examine the process of European integration.
II. EUROPEAN SECURITIES LAW
Comparisons of EC securities law and U.S. Securities law are inevi-
table and desirable. The two systems are very similar, though the EC
System appears at once less centralized and to define its basic terms
more completely. Paralells can also be seen in the federal structure.
Each federated state in the U.S. is a sovereign, 43 as is true of the
Member States of the EU.44 The U.S. federal government 45 and the
EU both exercise supreme46 yet limited powers.47 At the same time,
each has a certain flexibility.48
of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and
solidarity among Member States.
Id.
42. Todd A. Sulger, Harmonization Of Securities Market Regulations In The European Union:
Is The Price Tag Too High? 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221, 240 (1998).
43. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
44. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 5.
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objec-
tives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty.
Id.
45. U.S. CONST. Art. VI cl. 2.
46. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1.
47. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 5 (subsidiarity).
48. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 308; .S. CONST.
art I, § 8 cl.18.
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Because of these facts of federalism, the implementation and en-
forcement of securities law in the European Union is found in the
national law of the Member States. At the same time, the goals and
direction of EU Securities law are found in the Directives, regulations
and decisions of the Union. Member States retain the powers of regu-
lating their stock markets subject however to their obligations under
the EC and EU treaties. Thus, for example, procedure and practice to
determine whether an instrument is a security subject to regulation
are essentially found in national law49 though the substantive defini-
tions of securities are now included in the community Directives
themselves. Directives are implemented and enforced by the national
law of the the Member States which to some extent determine their
content, particularly where the Member States exercise their option to
offer greater protections than the minimum standards determined by
the EC.50
The policy goals of EC securities law are to protect investors, to
assure the proper functioning of the securities market (capital forma-
tion and allocation) and to attain uniform minimal standards through-
out the communities.51 This implies the necessity of investor
confidence in the stability and security of the market. These goals run
throughout European business law and can be seen just about any-
where in EC law one chooses to look. U.S. securities lawyers would
immediately recognize them:52 Investor confidence in the integrity of
the market is protected in order to assure adequate capital formation;
and Market manipulations are prohibited in order to assure proper
capital allocation. The ends of EU securities law look similar to those
seen in U.S. securities law, however, the means used to attain those
ends are at times different. To attain the goals of a stable and secure
single capital market, the EU uses Directives, principally, and conven-
tions and regulations secondarily. These instruments are in turn ap-
plied, interpreted or woven into the judgements of the European
Court of Justice (ECJ).
Directives are proposed by the European Commission and enacted
or rejected by the Council and if accepted become part of Community
49. Alexander B. St. John, The Regulation of Cross-Border Public Offerings of Securities In
The European Union: Present And Future, 29 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 239, 244-245 (2001).
50. See, e.g., Commission Directive 2004/72, art.6(2),7, 2004 O.J.(L 162) 70, 73-74 (Market
Abuse Directive).
51. Warren, supra note 38, at 215.
52. For a (critical) examination of the "ends" of U.S. securities laws, see, e.g., Stanislav Dolgo-
polo, Insider Trading And The Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation Of Adverse Selection In
Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 86 (2004).
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law.53 Directives address the Member States and present binding
guidelines for legislation to be implemented by the Member States. 54
If a Member State does not introduce legislation to transpose the Di-
rective into national law then the Commission can force it to do so
using Article 226 (ex article 169).55 Likewise, other Member States
can force the non-compliant Member State to act using Article 227 (ex
article 170).56 Further, individuals may also be able to enforce the Di-
rective. As a general rule, however, Directives do not create rights
enforcable by individuals57 because the addressee of Directives are
the Member States. For a provision of a Directive, regulation, or a
Treaty article to be directly effective to create directly enforcable
rights and duties inhering in individuals the provision of law must be
clear, precise and unconditional.58 However, non-implementation of a
Directive may also lead to a the Directive having direct effect, confer-
ring rights and duties on individuals. 59
The various Directives build bridges between the Member States on
the basis of their national laws. As can be seen from the above
description, there is no real equivalent to Directives in U.S. legisla-
tion. It would be as if congress ordered states to enact a law, but left
the means to do so up to the states. The closest analogy to Directives
in U.S. law are the enabling acts of administrative law which delegate
authority from congress to an agency to implement policies. But the
Directives are much more specific than enabling acts. The directives
do not address the creation of an agency with delegated powers.
Rather the directives address the Member States who must implement
their provisions by enacting laws. So the analogy is at best partial, but
at least gives some sense of how Directives work to a U.S. jurist.
Regulations are the other tool used by the EU to unify European
law. Regulations are binding rules issued by the Commission. 60 They
53. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 37(2).
54. Richard Cole, Authentic Democracy: Endowing Citizens With A Human Right In Their
Genetic Information, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1241, 1285 n. 186 (2005).
55. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the Eurpean Communities and Related Acts, art. 226, Nov. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 56 (1998), also
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 1996) (ex Art. 169, Treaty of Rome).
56. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 55, at art. 227 (ex Art. 170, Treaty of Rome).
57. See, e.g., Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb, SRL, 1994 E.C.R 1-3325.
58. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1. See http://europa.eu.int/comm/employ-
ment-social/fundamental-rights/legis/lgenforceen.htm (discussing enforcement of directives in
employment and racial discrimination cases).
59. Derek Devgun, Multilateral Capital Transfer Tax Treaty Relief Within The European Com-
munity, E.L. REV. 1995, 20(5), 451-470 (1995).
60. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 55, at art. 110(2).
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are self executing and have direct effect in the national legal systems
of the Member States. They are legislation, but legislation made, in
essence, by appointed representatives. For this reason Regulations are
very indirectly democratic. They are made by political appointees who
were appointed by elected representatives. It's democracy - but not as
we know it.
In some ways the EU legislative process is more centralized than in
the U.S. Congress does not order the states to enact legislation, but
that is just what a European Directive does to Member States. But in
most ways the EU is less centralized than the U.S. For example, Di-
rectives generally leave open how Member States are to implement
them. Still, the EU constitutes a confederation of the Member States
as there is a customs union, a common commercial and agricultural
policy and a common currency and border control system, at least as
to the core Member States and finally because the EC and by Exten-
sion the EU have international legal personality.
A. Company Law Directives
The exact legal basis of EU base securities law is a threshold ques-
tion. The very purpose of the Union is to create a single market in
labor capital goods and services. Yet, these goals are subject to the
constraints of subsidiarity:61 The Union should only act when the end
cannot be attained by the Member States working individually. How-
ever, because of the doctrine of supremacy, wherever the Union has
competence it essentially has exclusive competence. 62 Though securi-
ties law is currently an area of shared competence, the doctrine of
supremacy could be used by the EU to justify replacing the business
laws of the Member States with EU law.63 An argument against Com-
munity jurisdiction on the basis of subsidiarity64 would likely fail, all
the more so because of Art. 308 of the Amsterdam Treaty. 65
61. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 5.
62. Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie Onderneming van Gend en Loos v.
Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR 1.
63. Warren, supra note 38, at 212.
64. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 5.
65. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 41, at art. 308. EC Treaty
provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the oper-
ation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this Treaty
has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a pro-
posal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, take the
appropriate measures.
[Vol. 4:351
THE EU MEANS BUSINESS
The EU's business law Directives seek to create uniform minimum
standards throughout the community. Harmonization of company law
started with modest but generally applicable Directives issued pursu-
ant to under Article 94 (ex article 100) of the EC Treaty66 for the
harmonization of laws of the Member States directly affecting the
common market. The fields covered by Directives have, consistent
with functionalist method, grown constantly over time. Though har-
monization does not create a truly uniform law it does lay the ground-
work for eventual unification of EU securities law. What do the
existing laws look like?
1. Company Law Directives
The First Company law Directive67 obliges limited liability companies
and limited partnerships to register their constitutive documents and
requires them to provide an annual financial report.68 The Second
Company law Directive69 imposes minimum capitalization require-
ments and minimal disclosure requirements for public limited compa-
nies (corporations) as well as limiting corporate restructuring and
protects minority shareholders from abuse; Derogations from the
rules are possible where such will encourage employee ownership of
the company.70 The Third Company Law Directive 7' harmonizes laws
regarding interstate mergers of publicly traded companies and in-
cludes rules for disclosure and to protect employees and creditors.
The Fourth Company Law Directive 72 sets out minimum financial
statement and auditing requirements; Smaller companies can provide
summary financial statements.73 Acquisitions of companies involving
a sale of assets for shares are covered in the Sixth Company Law Di-
rective 74 which requires publication of the fusion plan, shareholder
approval for the sale, and sets out the required information to be pub-
lished.75 Information which must be published in company financial
statements is also addressed in the Seventh Company Law Directive.76
The Eighth Company Law Directive requires financial statements to
66. See Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 55, at art. 94.
67. Id. at art. 2 (e).
68. Directive 68/151/EEC, Art. 2 (e).
69. Council Directive 77/91, preamble., 1977 O.J. (L 26) 1 (EEC).
70. Id.
71. Council Directive 78/855, 1978 O.J. (L 295) 36 (EEC).
72. Council Directive 78/660, 1978 O.J. (L 222) 11 (EEC).
73. Id.
74. Council Directive 82/891, art. 307, 1982 O.J. (L 378) 47-54 (EEC) (discussing divisions of
public limited liability companies).
75. Id.
76. Council Directive 83/349, art. 7, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 31 (EEC).
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be audited by qualified auditors, and sets out minimum educational
and professional requirements of auditors.77
2. The New Prospectus Directive 78
In 2003 the EC issued a new Directive "On the Prospectus to be
Published when Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to
Trading" which amended Directive 2001/34/EC. 79 The new prospectus
Directive was also accompanied by a regulation implementing it which
specifies exactly the information to be listed in the prospectus.80 The
2003 Directive grouped together 81 the Listing Particulars Directive,8 2
and the Public Offer Prospectus Directive83 and refers to both to de-
fine its contours. At the same time, it amended Directive 2001/34. Di-
rective 2001/34 for its part grouped the Listing Admission Directive,8 4
the Interim Reports Directive,85 the Major Shareholdings Directive8 6
into one Directive and referred to those prior Directives to define its
scope.87 Thus to understand Directives 2003/71 and 2001/34, we must
be aware of the prior Directives. Specifically, 1) references to the pro-
visions of the repealed Directives are included in the new Directive.88
The new Directives essentially regroup and refine the earlier Direc-
tives. 2) The original Directives were transposed into national law and
thus may be relevant to understanding national law. 3) The interpreta-
tion of Directive 2003/71 or of 2001/34 may turn on how the prior
Directives were interpreted. The prior Directives may be persuasive
77. Council Directive 84/253, art, 3-6,1984 O.J (L 126) 20-26 (EEC).
78. Council Directive 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L.345) 64-89 (EC).
79. Id.
80. Commission Regulation 809/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1 (EC).
81. Council Directive 2003/71, preamble, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC).
82. Council Directive 80/390, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1-26 (EEC).
83. Council Directive 89/298, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8-15 (EEC).
84. Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21 (EEC), amended by Council Directive 82/
148, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22 (EEC).
85. Council Directive 82/121, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26-29 (EEC).
86. Council Directive 88/627, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 -65 (1988) (EEC).
87. Council Directive 2001/34, para. 1, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 36 (EC) states: "Directives 79/279/
EEC, 80/390/EEC, 82/121/EEC and 88/627/EEC, as amended by the acts listed in Annex II Part
A, are hereby repealed... 2. References to the repealed Directives shall be construed as refer-
ences to this Directive". Id.
88. Council Directive 2003/71, para. 3, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC). "For reasons of consistency,
however, it is appropriate to regroup the provisions of Directive 2001/34/EC which stem from
Directive 80/390/EEC together with Directive 89/298/EEC and to amend Directive 2001/34/EC
accordingly." Id.
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evidence of the meaning of current Directives, especially where the
later Directive refers explicitly to its predecessor.8 9
3. Public Offerings of Exchange-Listed Securities
a. The Listing Admission Directive
The Listing Admissions Directive determined conditions for listing
securities issued by one Member State on the stock exchanges of other
Member States. The goal of the Listing Admissions Directive, like the
new prospectus Directive (2003/71)90, was to protect investors by as-
suring adequate capitalization of companies 9 and to build the single
capital market by integrating securities law. 92 In essence, admission to
the stock market of one Member State permits the admitted security
to be traded on the stock market of another Member State as well.93
To protect investors the Listing Admissions Directive 94 required com-
panies to report material information which may affect the price of
the security 95 as does Directive 2003/71.96 The earlier Directive also
required companies to be adequately capitalized as does Directive
2001/34. 97 Offered securities must be freely and fully negotiable 98 and
a market for the securities must in fact exist.99
Financial information such as balance statements (annual reports)
must be published and disseminated by widely distributed newspapers
both in the earlier Directive100 and in Directives 2003/71101 and 2001/
34.102
89. See Case C-350/02, Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of the Nether-
lands, 2004 E.C.R.I-6213. Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v
Post & Telekom Austria AG, 2000 E.C.R. 1-10745.
90. Council Directive 2003/71, preamble, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64, 65 (EC) (discussing single mar-
ket and investor protection).
91. Todd A. Sulger, Harmonization Of Securities Market Regulations In The European Union:
Is The Price Tag Too High? 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 221, 225 (1998).
92. See St. John, supra note 49, at 245.
93. Council Directive 2003/71, art. 17, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 78 (EC).
94. Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21 (EEC), amended by Council Directive 82/
148, 1982 O.J. (L 62) 22 (EEC).
95. Sulger, supra note 91, at 224-225.
96. Council Directive 2003/71, art. 7, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 73 (EC).
97. Directive 2001/34, art. 43, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 22-23 (EC).
98. Id. at 23.
99. Id. at 22.
100. Warren, supra note 38, at 210.
101. Council Directive 2003/71, art. 14, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 76 (EC).
102. Directive 2001/34, art. 98, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 33 (EC).
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b. The Listing Particulars Directive
The Listing Particulars Directive covered securities which are "the
subject of an application for admission to official listing on a stock
exchange situated or operating within a Member State.' 0 3 The Direc-
tive required issuers of a security to issue their securities on the stock
market of their home state (their state of registration) if they will issue
securities in any other state.1°4 It also required disclosure of informa-
tion "necessary to enable investors . . . to make an informed assess-
ment of the assets and liabilities, financial position, profits and losses,
and prospects of the issuer and of the rights attaching to such securi-
ties. ' 10 5 including information about the issuer, the security, capitali-
zation, activities of the company, and its management team as well as
recent events and current prospects. 10 6 Exactly this language is re-
tained in Directive 2003/71.107 These mandatory disclosures are min-
ima. Member States could require greater disclosure. 10 8 The earlier
Directive'0 9 and its successor 2003/71 do not define what sanction
Member States are to impose, leaving the determination of the exact
contours of sanctions to Member States. 1 0
Listing particulars serve two functions: They provide initial infor-
mation to secondary markets11' and are the basis of the prospectus for
the public offering." 2 The requirements of the prospectus were set out
in the Listing Particulars Directive.113 The listing particulars require-
ments have been taken up in Directive 2001/34.
Though there are practical limits to how effective harmonization
can be in creating a unified legal system, the Listing Particulars Direc-
tive extended the EC's "philosophy of disclosure". 1 4 The EC cor-
rectly recognized that "it could not immediately replace the entire
field of securities regulation despite the primacy of EC law over na-
tional law in areas covered by the Treaty of Rome." 115 Rather than
trying to achieve an impossible ideal, the EC instead opted for what is
103. See Council Directive 80/390, 1980 O.J. ( L 100) 1-26(EEC).
104. See St. John, supra note 49, at 248. Id. at art. 8.
105. Id. at art. 4.
106. See St. John, supra note 49, at 248. Council Directive 80/390, art. 8, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1-
26 (EEC).
107. Council Directive 2003/71, art. 5, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 72073 (EC).
108. See St. John, supra note 49, at 249.
109. Warren, supra note 3,8 at 212.
110. Council Directive 2003/71, art. 25, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 81 (EC).
111. Directive 2001/34, preamble, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 9 (EC).
112. Warren, supra note 38, at 216
113. Id. at 216.
114. Id. at 212.
115. Id. at 212-213.
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possible but imperfect: Gradual but irreversible progress towards the
goal of a single market. The functionalist foundations of the process of
economic integration are once again shown in practice.
c. The Interim Reports Directive
The Interim Reports Directive obligated companies which issue eq-
uities on Member State stock exchanges to also provide semi-annual
balance sheets' 1 6 in order to allow investors to make informed deci-
sions about whether to purchase the security." 7 2001/34 in contrast
appears to require only annual reporting. n 8 The Interim Reports Di-
rective reqires the company to publish the information so that the
public can obtain it and transmit the information to the competent
authorities in each Member State where the security is sold.119 Again,
the goal of the Directive is an integrated single capital market 120 as is
the case of the successor Directives. There is still no common account-
ing standard such as GAAP or IAS valid throughout the EU. 121 And
that fact, along with language barriers, is one of the greater limits on
EU business integration. 22 In sum however, the various securities Di-
rectives are all aimed at transparancy and market integration and are
rational instruments developed to further desirable goals.
d. The Major Shareholdings Directive ("Anti-raiders" Directive)
The Major Shareholdings Directive requires a person who acquires or
disposes of a certain percentage of shares in a company (10%, 20%,
33 1/3%, 50% and 66 2/3%) to give notice to the company and the
public authorities responsable for stock market regulation.123 It was
incorporated into Directive 2001/34 as articles 85-97 and also in arti-
cles 102-110 of that Directive. 124 This transparency is intended to in-
crease shareholder protection and assure investor confidence resulting
in more efficient markets. 125 The Major Shareholdings Directive is
similar to SEC disclosure rules. 126 SEC Rule 13d-1127 is triggered
116. St. John, supra note 49, at 246.
117. Id.
118. 2001/34, art. 25(3), 2001 O.J. (L 184) 18 (EC).
119. Warren, supra note 38, at 214.
120. Id. at 214. 2001/34, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 7 (EC).
121. Id. at 214.
122. Sulger, supra note 91, at 230.
123. 2001/34, Annex III, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 71 (EC).
124. 2001/34, art. 89(1), 2001 O.J. (L 184) 31 (EC).
125. Warren, supra note 38, at 202.
126. For example, traders who would be otherwise liable for inside trading can immunize
themselves by disclosing inside information. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
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when a shareholder, or group of shareholders, acquires more than 5
percent of a company's stock.'2 8 13d imposes a filing obligation on the
shareholders. 129 However the primary objective of most other SEC
disclosure rules 130 is to protect ordinary investors by signaling them of
purchases and sales by large shareholders 131 as an indirect check on
insider trading whereas the Major Shareholdings Directive focusses
on maintaining a stable market. It is a question whether trades made
by large investors are observed because of inside information or
whether they are observed because of hostile takeovers. Since disclo-
sure is a low cost remedy, in fact both reasons justify requiring large
shareholders to signal their purchases and sales.
e. Prospectus Directive
The New Prospectus Directive essentially governs the conditions
under which the securities issued by a company incorporated in one
Member State will be admitted to the stock market and to the stock
markets of other Member States. The ultimate objective of the Direc-
tive is to create a system of mutual recognition to reduce transaction
costs associated with listing shares on other stock markets in the EU
in order to attain an integrated capital market. 132 To obtain that objec-
tive, investors have to know that the market is fair. Thus, a second
objective of the Directive is protection of investors 133 via disclosure
rules. Full disclosure should thus help improve capital formation and
allocation. 134 Protection of investors and the creation of an integrated
capital market are complementary goals the Directive seeks to attain
so that European securities can compete on the global market. 35
127. Rule 13d-1, pursuant to beneficial ownership reporting requirements in § 13(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
128. Broc Romanek, Mark S. Britton, Online Shareholder Activism: How to Guard Against its
Fallout 20 No. 5 ACCA Docket 32, 37 (2002).
129. Id. at 36.
130. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n (d)l (2002).
131. Shaun Mulreed, Private Securities Litigation Reform Failure: How Scienter has Prevented
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 From Achieving Its Goals, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 779, 784 n. 14 (2005).
132. "In accordance with the principle of proportionality, it is necessary and appropriate for
the achievement of the basic objective of ensuring the completion of a single securities market to
lay down rules on a single passport for issuers." Council Directive 2003/71, preamble, 2003 O.J.
(L 345) 68 (EC).
133. "One of the objectives of this Directive is to protect investors." Id. at 65.
134. Warren, supra note 38, at 209-210.
135. "The aim of this Directive and its implementing measures is to ensure investor protection
and market efficiency, in accordance with high regulatory standards adopted in the relevant
international fora." Council Directive 2003/71, preamble, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 65 (EC).
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Accordingly, the New Prospectus Directive imposes on Member
States a duty to require companies seeking to make public offerings of
their securities to present a prospectus detailing financial and manage-
ment information about the company and its shares for any security
offered to the public within the territory of a Member State. 136 The
Directive creates minimum uniform disclosure standards throughout
the community for public offerings of securities, irrespective of
whether those securities are listed or unlisted.137 Listing particulars
can be used throughout the EC interchangeably 138 which should help
to build the integrated capital market. The earlier Prospectus Direc-
tive was "a first step towards a Community prospectus" 139 which the
new directive fulfills.
Like the SEC registration requirements for publicly traded securi-
ties, the prospectus Directive does not apply to certain limited offer-
ings. These include offerings to a "restricted circle of persons," or to
"persons in the context of their trades, professions or occupations".
Small offerings are also exempt 140 as are offerings arising out of merg-
ers and acquisitions1 41 and intercompany compensation of employees
or management. 142 Similar exemptions for small offerings to exper-
ienced investors143 and a qualified investor exemption appears in the
New Prospectus Directive as well.144 These are similar to the excep-
tions to the prospectus requirements of the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, which exempts small offerings to qualified
investors from filing with the SEC.1 45
Member States must in principle grant reciprocal recognition to
those issuers who have a registered office in that Member State' 46 The
Member State which must recognize the registration may not gener-
ally require more information than the other Member State re-
quires 147 with the exception of relevant local information, in particular
regarding the Member State's tax system.148 The Directive permits
Member States to limit the reciprocity requirement to issuers having
136. Id. at 71. Council Directive 89/298, art. 4, 9, 16, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8-15 (EEC) (repealed).
137. Warren, supra note 38 at 215.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 216.
140. Council Directive 2003/71, art. 3(1), 2003 O.J. (L 345) 71 (EC).
141. Id. at 71-72.
142. Id.
143. Council Directive 2001/34, art. 17, 2001 O.J. (L 184) 18-19 (EC).
144. Council Directive 2003/71, preamble, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 8 (EC).
145. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 3-4, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(c), 78(d) (2004).
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their registered offices in a Member State 149 as does the successor
2001/34150
In conclusion, the securities Directives "demonstrate the principles
of minimum standards, mutual recognition and home country control
that are basic tenets of the single market in securities.' 1 51 There are
however some practical limits on the effectiveness of the Directives.
Understandably, stock exchanges insist on a translation of listing par-
ticulars and often place further requirements on foreign issuers wish-
ing to list on their exchange. 152 Nevertheless, the Directives do move
Europe toward the goal of a single integrated market.
4. The Insider Trading Directive
Insider trading law shows the influence of the EC on the Member
States law most clearly. Prior to the Insider Trading Directive, insider
trading was treated differently in each Member State, being a criminal
offense in some states, yet perfectly legal in others. 153 Here, the EC
has acted to create a Community standard and today insider trading is
regarded as wrongful throughout the EU.
The first community prohibition of insider trading was the 1989 Di-
rective. 154 This Directive has since been replaced by a more compre-
hensive Directive 155 which covers shares and a variety of option
contracts as well as prohibiting market manipulation. Market manipu-
lation is defined as trading or disseminating information in order to
give false or misleading signals as to price movements.156 Again, the
directive is more specific about defining market manipulation than Se-
curities Exchange Act (SEA) Section 10b, which prohibits "any ma-
nipulative or deceptive device or contrivance". 157 This might be
because the SEA was enacted in the wake of the greatest stock mar-
ket crash in history, whereas the directives were not. The 2003 Direc-
tive covers shares, unit trusts, money markets instruments, futures,
swaps, options, derivatives and any other instrument trading on a reg-
149. Id. at 14.
150. Id. at 21.
151. Karmel, supra note 39, at 20.
152. Id.
153. Insider trading was legal in Germany until 1994. See, e.g., Anupama J. Naidu, Was its Bite
Worse than its Bark? The Costs Sarbanes-Oxley Imposes on German Issuers may Translate into
Costs to the United States, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 271, 299 (2004).
154. Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading, 1989 O.J. (C 277) 13 [1
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)] T 95,028.
155. Council Directive 2003/6,2003 O.J. (L 96) 16-26 (EC).
156. Id. at 20.
157. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994) (discussing manipulative
and deceptive devices).
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ulated market or for which a request to trade has been made.158 Once
again the terms are more specific than the 1933 and 1934 acts which
defines security very broadly159 - so broadly in fact that even invest-
ments in a common ponzi scheme have been held to be a security.1 60
The basic premises of the 1989 Directive are retained within the 2003
Directive and the 1989 Directive may be persuasive evidence of the
meaning of the 2003 Directive.
a. Rationale of the Insider Trading Directive
The EC takes the position that insider trading undermines investor
confidence, 161 which leads to sub-optimal clearing of securities mar-
kets.162 These rationales of the 1989 Directive are also found in the
2003 Directive.1 63 They are essentially the same rationales for the pro-
158. Council Directive 2003/6, art. 1(3), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 21 (EC).
159. The Securities Act of 1933 defines "security" as:
[A]ny note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certifi-
cate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral trust certifi-
cate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment
contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undi-
vided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security', or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1).
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 defines "security" as:
[Any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participa-
tion in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease,
any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security,
or in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'security' or any certificate of inter-
est or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or
right to subscribe to any purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency
or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any re-
newal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
160. Sec. & Exch.Comm'n,v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476; (9th Cir. 1973).
161. See, e.g., Case C-384/02, Criminal Proceedings against Knud Grongaard and Allan Bang,
2005 (C 384) par. 22 (ECR). "Directive 89/592 prohibits insider dealing with the aim of protect-
ing investor confidence in the secondary market for transferable securities and, consequently, of
ensuring the proper functioning of that market." Id.
162. Adoption of Insider Trading Rules Creates Wide Ban on Use of Information, 2 Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 1 (June 21, 1989). See also Case C-384/02, Criminal Proceedings
against Knud Grongaard and Allan Bang, 2005 (C 384) par. 22 (ECR). "Directive 89/592 prohib-
its insider dealing with the aim of protecting investor confidence in the secondary market for
transferable securities and, consequently, of ensuring the proper functioning of that market." Id.
163. Council Directive 2003/6, preamble, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16,17 (EC).
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hibition of insider trading that one sees in U.S. law.' 64 But, unlike the
U.S., at the time of the adoption of the Insider Trading Directive, in-
sider trading was by no means a criminal offence in all or even a ma-
jority of Member States. 165 The Directive seeks to improve protection
against abuse throughout the community.
The Directive essentially shifted the focus on insider trading from
''pure company law" which juxtaposed the company's interest against
the insiders based on a rationale that insider trading is a breach of
fiduciary duty to a multilateral approach. Under the modern multilat-
eral approach, stockholders, employees, managers, and the general
public are seen as having competing interests to be balanced and the
rationale for the prohibition of insider trading is to maintain market
efficiency. 166 The basis of the Directive is not in Art. 54 of the Treaty
of Rome but in Art. 100a of the Single European Act.167
b. Insider Defined
The 1989 predecessor Directive clearly defined the term "insider",
unlike U.S. law, where the term is not statutorily defined. An insider
is one who, due to his relationship to the company as manager, direc-
tor, employee or major shareholder, posesses inside information (ma-
terial non-public facts) and knowingly uses such inside information to
acquire or dispose of securities to which the information relates for his
own account or another. 168 The 2003 Directive not only directs the
prohibition to persons who acquired inside information due to their
position as a director, manager, employee or majority shareholder but
includes those who acquired the information illegally.169
164. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1933 defines itself as "[A]n [Act] [t]o provide full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and
through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes." Securities
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states that
its purposes are ". . . to protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing
power, to protect and make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve
System, and to insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions." Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, §15 U.S.C.A. §78(b) (2006).
165. E.g., supra note 153.
166. Stephen J. Leacock, In Search Of A Giant Leap: Curtailing Insider Trading In Interna-
tional Securities Markets By The Reform Of Insider Trading Laws Under European Union Coun-
cil Directive 89/592, 3 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. 51, 58 (1995).
167. Id.
168. Council Directive 89/592, art. 2, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30-32 (EEC).
169. Council Directive 2003/6, art. 2(1)(a-d), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 21 (EC) (defining insiders as
members of boards of Directives, key management, large shareholders and even employees of
the company).
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The 1989 Directive prohibited insiders from "tipping" others about
inside information except in the course of ordinary business. 170 The
prohibition of "tipping", 171 as well as the exception for trades in the
ordinary course of business are also found in the Directive 2003/6.172
"Tipping", a source of controversy and uncertainty in U.S. securities
law, is more clearly defined in E.U. law than in U.S. law173 as are the
instances where "tipping" is permitted. The "safe harbor" provisions
allowing disclosure of inside information in the ordinary course of em-
ployment ("tipping") are, as an exception to a general rule, to be in-
terpreted strictly.174 Thus, disclosure of inside information in the
course of employment is also prohibited unless "there is a close link
between the disclosure and the exercise of his employment, profession
or duties, and that disclosure is strictly necessary for the exercise of
that employment, profession or duties. ' 175 That is, disclosure of inside
information in the course of employment will be seen as rightful "only
if it is strictly necessary for the exercise of an employment, profession
or duties and complies with the principle of proportionality. ' 176 The
court will examine the quality of the disclosed information to deter-
mine whether the disclosure was, given the actual facts of the case,
necessary. 177 One could thus predict a correlation between the impact
of information on prices inversely to the probability that the informa-
tion rightfully disclosed. In all events, the judicial interpretations of
the meaning of the earlier Directive very likely apply to the successor
Directive.
170. Id. Case C-384/02, Criminal Proceedings against Knud Grongaard and Allan Bang, 2005
(C 384) par. 26 (ECR) (stating that under Article 3(a) of Directive 89/592, the prohibition of
disclosing inside information does not apply to its disclosure by a person in the normal course of
the exercise of his employment, profession or duties).
171. Council Directive 2003/6, art. 3(a), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 21 (EC).
172. Id.
173. Tippees are defined as those to whom fiduciary duty can be imputed based on their
relationship to an insider and/or the character of the information they received. See U.S. v.
Chiarella 588 F.2d 1358, 1365-67; (2d. Cir. 1978) rev'd, U.S. v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
That definition is ambiguous.
174. Grongaard, 2005 E.C.R. 11-0000. "Even if that rule, having regard to the terms used, is
capable of covering very different situations, it must, as an exception to a general prohibition
and in the light of the objective pursued by Directive 89/592, be interpreted strictly." Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. (stating that "[in order to determine whether a disclosure is justified in a particu-
lar case, it is appropriate to take account also of the sensitivity of the inside information in
question. Particular care is required when the disclosure is of inside information manifestly capa-
ble of affecting significantly the price of the transferable securities in question. In that context, it
is appropriate to observe that inside information relating to a merger between two companies
quoted on the stock exchange is in general particularly sensitive.").
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c. Inside Information Defined
The 1989 Directive and its 2003 successor clearly define "inside in-
formation". 178 This is not the case in U.S. law: Just as "insider" is not
clearly defined in U.S. law179 so also is "inside information" undefined
in the relevant SEC legislation and regulations. 180 In U.S. law the con-
cepts, presumptions and rationales for the prohibition of insider trad-
ing are amorphous at best, conflicting at worst. The theoretical
situation is better in Europe because the basic terms of the law are
clearer.
What is inside information? The 1989 Directive defined inside infor-
mation as "information which is unknown to the public of a specific
nature and relating to one or more issuers of transferable securities, or
to one or more transferable securities, which, if it were published,
would be likely to have a material effect on the price of the transfera-
ble security or transferable securities in question."' 181 The 2003 Direc-
tive similarly provides that: "'Inside information' shall mean
information of a precise nature which has not been made public, ralat-
ing, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instru-
ments or to one or more financial instruments and which, if it were
made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices
of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative fi-
nancial instruments.' ' 182
The European Directive's definition of insider trading is clearer
than the U.S. definition. However, the same elements arise in both
legal systems: Materiality and Publicity ("material non-public infor-
mation"). l 3 However, "[U]nlike the U.S. insider trading laws, deter-
mination of illegal trading is based not on breach of a fiduciary duty,
but rather, on possession of non-public information.'" 84 That is, both
the rationale and definition of prohibited conduct are clearer in the
EU than in the U.S.
178. Council Directive 2003/6, art. 1(1), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 20 (EC).
179. "The term 'insider' is not defined by statute in the context of the U.S. prohibitions
against insider trading." Michael D. Mann & Lise A. Lustgarten, Internationalization of Insider
Trading Enforcement: A Guide to Regulation and Cooperation, PLI/Corp 7, 14 (1993).
180. "In fact, section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 (or any of the federal statutes, rules, or regula-
tions) do not define 'insider trading' or 'inside information' (or 'misappropriation,' for that mat-
ter)." Micah A. Acoba, Insider Trading Jurisprudence after United States v. O'Hagan: A
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551(2) Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1356, 1362 (1999).
181. Warren, supra note 38, at 220.
182. Council Directive 2003/6, art. 1(1), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 20 (EC).
183. See U.S. v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 475 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2003).
184. Karmel, supra note 39, at 23.
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d. Prohibition of Insider Trading
The text of the 1989 Directive and the 2003 Directive are similar so
we can expect that interpretations of the 1989 text would be likely to
apply to the 2003 text. The 1989 Directive orders Member States to
forbid:
... any person who.., has access to such information by virtue of
the exercise of his employment, profession or duties, possesses in-
side information from taking advantage of that information ... by
acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for the account of a
third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable securities of the
issue or issuers to which that information relates. 185
And its successor version in 2003 says:
Member States shall prohibit any person referred to in the second
subparagraph who possesses inside information from using that in-
formation by acquiring or disposing of, or by trying to acquire or
dispose of, for his own account or for the account of a third party,
either directly or indirectly, financial instruments to which that in-
formation relates.186
Thus, rather than seeing the 2003 Directive as displacing case law and
legislation developed under the 1989 Directive we should expect to
see the courts interpreting the 2003 Directive in light of the 1989 Di-
rective and its attendant case law.
e. Prohibition of Market Manipulation
Unlike the 1989 Directive, the 2003 Directive prohibits market ma-
nipulation. Market manipulation is clearly defined as transactions
which give false or misleading signals to the market as to supply and
demand or which fix the price of a given issue at an abnormal or artifi-
cial level. 187 Art. 2(b) of the Market Abuse Directive uses language
quite similar to SEA Section 10, including in market manipulation:
"transactions or orders to trade which employ fictitious devices or any
other form of deception or contrivance;"' 18 Subsection 2(c) goes on to
list some possible manipulative devices, such as internet rumor
mongering. That list is of course not exhaustive.
f. Sanctions for market abuse
Both the 1989 and 2003 inside trading Directives require Member
States to enact sanctions for insider trading but do not define what
185. Council Directive 89/592, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 30, (EEC).
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they may be.' 89 Thus a Member State could punish insider trading as a
crime or a tort or both. This shows that Directives permit a flexible
and nuanced response to the problems posed by the construction of
the single market, all the more so when we remember that Directives
generally establish minimum standards which Member States can
exceed. 190
5. The Financial Instruments Directive
The Investment Services Directive (ISD) was adopted in order to
foster the formation of a single continental capital market pursuant to
art. 57 of the Treaty of Rome.1 91 It has since been modified by the
Directive on financial instruments.192 References to the ISD are now
construed to refer to the Financial Instruments Directive. 93 The Fi-
nancial Instruments Directive 94 establishes minimum standards
throughout the community and to provide mutual recognition of
Member State business entities. 195 Mutual recognition enables a com-
pany registered in one Member State to do business anywhere in the
community without reregistering1 96 The obverse of a single market is
prevention of protectionism: As seen in Commission v. Italy,197 the
single market for financial services implies an opposition to any form
of intra-community protectionism, whether in goods, services, or
movement of capital and labor.
The Financial Instruments Directive applies to investment firms and
regulated markets generally.198 Insurance companies, "in house" asset
managers and certain pension funds are not covered.' 99 The Directive
sets out minimum capital requirements for financial services compa-
nies2°° as well as requires the maintenance of an office in the country
where it will do business to assure the expertise and reputability as a
financial services provider.201 Disclosure and transparancy require-
189. Warren, supra note 38, at 220.
190. See, e.g., Council Directive 2003/6, art. 6(2), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16, 21 (EC).
191. See generally Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1; Council
Directive 93/22, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27 (EEC).
192. Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
193. Id. at 39.
194. Id. at 1.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Karen M. Smith, The Need for Centralized Securities Regulation in the European Union,
24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 205, 210 (2000).
197. Case C-101/94, E.C. Commission v. Italy, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2691, [1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 754
(1996).
198. Council Directive 2004/39, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 8 (EC).
199. Council Directive 2004/39, art. 2, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 8 (EC).
200. Council Directive 93/22, art. 3, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27, 37 (EEC).
201. See Council Directive 2004/39, art. 5, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 12 (EC).
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ments are also a part of the Directive. 20 2 Service providers are obli-
gated to execute trades on terms most favorable to their clients.20 3
6. Life Insurance Directives
The Third Life Directives 20 4 permits cross border life insurance bus-
iness "but has accomplished little with regard to liberalizing cross bor-
der securities investment. '20 5 However it too demonstrates the will to
create an integrated financial services market.
7. Mutual Funds Directive (UCIT) 20 6
Undertakings for the Collective Investment in Transferable Securi-
ties (UCITS), better known in American English as mutual funds, 207
or in Britain as PEPs, are investment companies that makes money
buy purchasing and selling shares in other companies. According to
the UCITS Directive such funds "may be constituted according to the
law of contract (as common funds managed by management compa-
nies) or trust law (as unit trusts) or under statute (as investment com-
panies). ' 20 8 The UCITS must be authorized in the Member State
where they do business 20 9 but once authorized may do business any-
where in the Union.210 UCITS may only invest in securities listed in a
Member State or approved regulated foreign markets. UCITS may
not borrow funds and must be able to redeem units of shareholders
when asked to do so. 211 UCITS are regulated by the state of incorpo-
ration though the marketing of UCITS units are subject to the mar-
keting laws of the host state. 212
202. Id. at 18.
203. Id. at 17.
204. Council Directive 92/49, 1992 O.J. (L 228) 1 (EEC), amended by Council Directive 95/26,
1995 O.J. (L 168) 7 (EC); Council Directive 92/96, 1992 O.J. (L 360) 1 (EEC), amended by
Council Directive 95/26, O.J. (L 168) 7 (EC).
205. Karmel, supra note 39, at 27.
206. Council Directive 85/611, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3 (EEC).
207. Allan S. Mostoff & Olivia P. Adler, Collective Investment Vehicles, C700 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
499, 534 (1991).
208. HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND
SECURITIES REGULATION § 50:29 (2005) (quoting Council Directive 85/611/EEC, art. 1, 1985
O.J. (L 375) 3 (EEC).
209. Council Directive 85/611, art. 4, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3 (EEC).
210. Council Directive 85/611, art 1, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3 (EEC).
211. Samuel Wolff, Securities Regulation in the European Community, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 99, 141 (1991).
212. Warren, supra note 38, at 218-19.
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9. Banking Directive 213
The Second Banking Directive establishes a single license appli-
cable throughout the EU for the provision of banking and other
financial services. Banks operating under the Second Banking Di-
rective may provide a wide variety of financial services, including
investment services, authorized by the home Member State, without
obtaining an additional license. 214
10. Limits of Directives
There are practical limits on the use of Directives to achieve legal
harmonization. As mentioned earlier, Directives are not generally di-
rectly applicable. A Directive may however have direct effect if "(i)
the obligations are clear and unambiguous, (ii) they are unconditional
and (iii) their operation is not dependent on further action by the
community". 215
Because the Directive must be implemented seperately in each
Member State there is a risk of conflicting interpretations and more
seriously of duplicated effort. Further, Directives are the result of
compromises and thus may be conflicted, yet at the same time are a
bit inflexible and are difficult to amend.216 However Directives are
effective at encouraging creation of community wide minimum stan-
dards. Though imperfect, Directives do work generally speaking.
Moreover, Directives build the consensus necessary for legitimate
market integration. Other mechanisms for harmonization of law do
exist, namely conventions and regulations, which we now examine.
B. Conventions: The Insider Trading Convention
Article 293 (ex art. 220) ECT obliges the Member States to negoti-
ate among themselves to abolish double taxation in the Community.
Unlike Directives, conventions are not a part of Community law. 217
Community institutions are not necessarily at all involved in the con-
clusion of an international convention, even one made pursuant to
Art. 293 ECT.
Directives are generally not directly applicable and do not create
rights enforcable by individuals. Likewise, though an international
213. Council Directive 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 (EEC).
214. Samuel Wolff, Recent Developments In European Union Securities Law, 30 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 292, 296 (2002).
215. Devgun, supra note 59, at 464.
216. Gilles Thieffry, Towards a European Securities Commission, J. INT'L FIN. MKTS. 1999,
1(7), 300, 300 (1999).
217. See, e.g., Case T-67/01, JCB Service v Commission, 2004 E.C.R. 11-49.
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convention might be directly applicable, the better view is that inter-
national conventions are presumed not to create directly enforcable
individual rights and duties unless they explicitly otherwise affirm.
There is at least one tax convention made pursuant to Art. 293
ECT: The Transfer Pricing Arbitration Convention. 218 The Transfer
Pricing Arbitration Convention provides a mechanism for Member
States to arbitrate their disputes regarding double taxation of a busi-
ness which transfers profits from operations in one Member State to
another. There is also a convention addressing insider trading. The
insider trading convention 219 seeks to create mutual assistance mecha-
nisms for the exchange of information. The insider trading convention
defines an insider as a director, officer, board member or their agent.
Inside information is defined as non-public information obtained from
the insider's employment and which if disclosed would be likely to
have a significant influence on the stock market.220 State parties are
obligated to exchange information about suspected inside trading.221
C. Regulations: The Council Regulation for a European Economic
Interest Grouping
Another tool for harmonization of community law is the regulation.
Unlike Directives, regulations are immediately effective:222 They do
not require any national legislation to be implemented. Because regu-
lations are binding law throughout the entire community it is more
difficult to enact regulations than Directives and this limits their use.
The EEIG Regulation creates the European Economic Interest
Group 223 (EEIG). The EEIG is essentially an institutional form for
joint venture partnerships between two or more companies, whether
public or private. The contract concluded does not create a legal per-
son independant of the partners to the EEIG, though the EEIG can
enter into contracts in its own name.224 Though the EEIG must regis-
ter in the Member State where it is domiciled, it is governed by EU
218. Convention 90/436, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 10 (EEC).
219. Convention on Insider Trading, European Treaty Series No. 130, Strasbourg, 20.IV (open
to both non-member and Member States). The convention essentially provides for mutual assis-
tance and cooperation by the authorities regarding investigation of financial frauds. Id.
220. Id. art. 1.
221. Id. art. 2.
222. See Case C-499/03, Nahrungsmittel GmbH v. Commission of the European Communi-
ties, 2005 E.C.R. 1-1751; Case C-253/00, Antonio Mufioz y Cia SA, Superior Fruiticola SA v
Frumar Ltd., Redbridge Produce Mktg. Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. 1-7289.
223. Council Regulation 2137/85, 1985 O.J.(L 199) 1 (EEC).
224. Hans-Jurgen Zahorka, EEIG European Economic Interest Grouping, 5 (2001) available
at www.eito.org/download/EEIG.pdf.
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law.225 Like any joint venture partnership, the parties to an EEIG do
not enjoy limited liability, though this drawback as far as tort liability
may also be an advantage as far as lenders are concerned since either
partner would be responsible for the debts of the partnership. Article
308 ECT (ex art. 235) is the basis of the EEIG.2 26
D. Comparison
1. Comparison of EU and U.S. Securities Law
There are some similiarities but also differences between the regime
mandated by the Directive and U.S. securities law. SEA Section 10227
and Regulation 10b(5) 228 prohibit trading on material non-public in-
formation, 229 like the Directive. However it is unclear whether Section
10b is based on a theory of breach of fiduciary duty, fraud on the
market, misappropriation of information, or any or all of these theo-
ries. It is just as unclear to whom duties are owed. In contrast the
Directive is clear that it is based not on breach of fiduciary duty but
on posession of material non-public information. Courts interpreting
SEA Section 10b and Regulation 10b(5) 230 find an implied private
right of action. 231 The Directive does not provide for any private right
of action. Once again, there is much less chaos in the European legis-
lation. Unlike the Directive, which clearly defines both what inside
information is and who is an insider Section 10b does not define or
even use those terms, though courts do.
225. Warren, supra note 38, at 201.
226. Thieffry, supra note 216, at 301.
227. 15 U.S.C: § 78j (2000) (prohibiting "any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any secur-
ity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.. .any manipula-
tive or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors.").
228. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004) (stating "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.").
229. U.S. v. Svoboda 347 F.3d 471, 475 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2003).
230. SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
231. See, e.g., Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing
implied action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act).
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As seen, there are both important similiarites and divergences be-
tween the Directive and the SEA. U.S. securities law is essentially fed-
eral, though vestigal state anti-fraud provisions in tort such as the tort
of deceit 232 do still exist and supplement the federal provisions. This is
just about the opposite of Europe, where the securities laws of the
Member States are still the starting point. Though, as time passes, the
European law will displace the national laws.
One key feature of U.S. securities law is that it usually permits both
a criminal action by the state and a private enforcement by individu-
als. This "privatization" of the public's authority to punish crime is
much more often available in the U.S. than in Europe. Directives do
not provide for private enforcement because they are meant to estab-
lish goals and guidelines, requiring the Member States to take action,
but leaving to the Member States how to implement them. Further,
Directives only provide for minimum standards - Member States are
generally free to go beyond the minima of the Directives and to pro-
pose greater protections.233 Ironically this flexibility also explains why
a truly uniform European law cannot not be attained using Directives.
Yet, Directives can create the groundwork necessary if one day crea-
tion of a European Code to displace national laws were desired. In all
events, while in fact unlikely, a Member State could create a private
right of action in its own national law and this would quite likely be
found to be consistent with the Directives' goals and permissible
range of action. The EU can attain a clearer and more coherent law of
insider trading than the U.S. Whether it can do so throughout Europe
is the greater challenge.
2. A European Securities and Exchange Commission?
Some authors recommend that the EU establish its own Securities
and Exchange Commission. For example, Manning argues that:
[Tihe EU should ... reestablish the European Securities Committee
as an independent administrative agency that would, in addition to
its rule-making authority, help develop and monitor the proposed
centralized clearance and settlement system, maintain the proposed
centralized filing system, collect and disseminate compliance and
enforcement data, coordinate Member State enforcement of EU se-
curities laws and regulations, monitor the administration of alterna-
232. Bradford Third Equitable Benefit Building Society v Borders, [1941] 2 All ER 205
(House of Lords 1941) (explaining the tort of deceit).
233. See, e.g., Case C-28/99, Criminal Proceeding Against Verdonck, 2001 E.C.R. 1-3399 (stat-
ing that "Article 6 of Directive 89/592 does not preclude the application of legislative provisions
of a Member State which, as regards the prohibition of use of inside information, are more
stringent than those laid down by the directive").
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tive dispute resolution proceedings, and provide consumer
education to retail investors to further develop and protect its uni-
fied retail securities market.234
His is not the only voice and is essentially correct. The EU should
develop a securities and exchange authority because a central author-
ity can act more rapidly and decisively, and also because a central au-
thority will inevitably develop a unitary law reducing legal uncertainty
and transaction costs. 235 Twenty five or more national authorities are
inevitably going to be less efficient and inevitably divided in their ap-
proach than one central authority. Moreover, a central authority can
and should look not just at sectors, which is the current approach,236
but rather at the entire financial services business.237 "Just as the euro
required the establishment of a European Central Bank, a pan-Euro-
pean equity market will require a European SEC. 23
8
Opponents of an EU SEC center their arguments around the idea
that private market incentives will best protect investors. 239 However,
private remedies would do so suboptimally, since there would be
twenty five different national views with attendant uncertainty and
higher transaction costs.
a. Disclosure
Inside traders in U.S. law are under an obligation to disclose the
inside information or abstain from trading. One author recommends
increased disclosure as a part of EU securities law, noting that: "Inves-
tors need consistency and comparability in financial statement
presentations and timely disclosure of material corporate events. 240
For example, there is no equivalent to the shareholder's right to in-
spection guaranteed by the EU in any of the Directives. Similarly, the
EU needs to either complete the establishment of international ac-
counting standards (IAS) or accept the reality that the U.S. standard
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are the world
234. Warren, supra note 38, at 220.
235. Smith, supra note 196, at 216.
236. See, e.g., Michael Gruson, Supervision of Financial Holding Companies in Europe: The
EU Directive on Supplementary Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, 36 INT'L LAW. 1229,
1235-1236 (2002) (stating "[t]he existing EU legal framework for the supervision of financial
institutions is incomplete because it only covers the so-called sectoral supervision, that is, super-
vision over institutions within a particular sector of the financial industry. Cross-sectoral supervi-
sion of financial groups, combining institutions from different financial sectors, exists only to a
limited extent.").
237. Smith, supra note 196, at 217.
238. Karmel, supra note 39, at 33.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 35.
[Vol. 4:351
THE EU MEANS BUSINESS
standard.24' Uniform standards for accounting and languages would
result in lower transaction costs and greater market efficiency.
b. The Legal Basis of the EU SEC: Art. 308 and/or Art. 2
If a European Securities Authority were created it would most
likely be based on Article 308 ECT (ex art. 235).242 Art. 308 provides
that:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the
course of the operation of the Common Market, one of the objec-
tives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the neces-
sary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after consulting the European Parlia-
ment, take the appropriate measures.
This clause might be compared to the combined effect of the elastic
clause243 and the commerce clause 244 in the U.S. constitution in that it
theoretically empowers the Community to do much more than is ex-
plicitly stated in other provisions of the treaty. However, at least to
now, Art. 308 is not as liberally construed as the commerce clause of
the U.S. constitution. The action taken under Art. 308 must be "neces-
sary to attain" an "objective of the Community", as no other provision
addresses a securities and exchange authority. The objective to be ob-
tained, a single market in securities, is clearly a central task of the
Community as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty:
[T]he Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common
market and an economic and monetary union and by implementing
common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 4, to pro-
mote throughout the Community a harmonious, balanced and sus-
tainable development of economic activities and economic and
social cohesion and solidarity among Member States.
Further in Article 3.1(c) and 3.1(g) state that:
1. For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Commu-
nity shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with
the timetable set out therein:
(c) an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between
Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, per-
sons, services and capital;
(g) a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not
distorted;
Thus, if the goals of a single capital market cannot be achieved with
twenty five national authorities - that is, if the subsidiarity argument
241. Id.
242. See Thieffry, supra note 216, at 301.
243. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
244. Id. art. I, § 8, c. 3.
2006]
382 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
can be overcome, which I think is the case - then these provisions of
the the Treaty would be the basis of a Europen Securities Authority.
As there is a European Prospectus Regulation it is likely that Europe
will at some point establish a central securities authority. Like the sin-
gle currency, the reduced transaction costs and economies resulting
make such a development desirable.
II. EUROPEAN TAX LAW
Just as Europe seeks to harmonize securities law it also seeks to
create a uniform tax law, albeit less succesfully. It uses the same in-
struments: Directives, regulations, conventions and case law.
A. Tax Teleology
Adam Smith long ago set out four principles of taxation: Taxes
should be simple. Taxes should be levied according to ability to pay.
Taxes should be easy to administer. Taxes should be certain and eco-
nomically neutral.245 This idea that taxation should be economically
neutral to avoid economic distortion is a part of the European tax
system, however imperfectly implemented246 and this idea is at the
root of several community decisions.247 This can be seen for example
in the fiscal aspects of state aids. State subsidization of industry nor-
mally would be seen by economists as a distortion of the free market.
For this reason, direct and indirect state aids are problematic under
the EC Treaty.
245. 5 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS CH. 2 (University of Chicago Press 1976) (1776).
246. Sandra Eden, Corporate Tax Harmonisation in the European Community, 6 BRIT. TAX
REV. 624, 624 (2000).
At an economic level the issue is simple-in order for the single market to operate
smoothly, the aggregate effects of 15 tax systems should ensure that there are neither
disincentives nor incentives for business to be conducted in one place rather than an-
other. This is actually rather easily achieved at a technical level. If all Member States
operate the same tax system, using the same tax base and rates, and exempt all foreign
income, there will be perfect neutrality as to location. The overlay of the real world
with its political and social issues makes matters more difficult. This makes it necessary
to unpack the notion of neutrality in order to understand more clearly the ways in
which the inter-relationship of national tax systems causes problems of distortion, and
what can be done about them.
Id.
247. See, e.g., Peter Dreher, European Community Taxation, 4(8) INT'L CO. & COM. L. REV.
295 (1993).
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B. State Aids and Taxation
EU Member States cannot grant aid which threatens to distort the
single market. Article 87(1) (ex Article 92(1)) provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a
Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring cer-
tain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far
as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the
common market.
State aid is not defined by the EC Treaty,2 48 however, favorable tax
treatment such as a tax credit can constitute a state aid. Though, de
minimis state aids are permissible, 249 Art. 87 is to be construed nar-
rowly.250 Taxes used to finance state aids which were found permissi-
ble under Art. 87, have been held nevertheless invalid as interfering
with the single market under Art. 90 (ex art. 95)251 for if the court
were to consider a state aid separately from the financing mechanism
used to fund it and attain it would be impossible to attain the objec-
tives of the EC Treaty.25 2 For example:
It may be that aid properly so-called, although not in conformity
with Community law, does not substantially affect trade between
states and may thus be acknowledged as permissible but that the
disturbance which it creates is increased by a method of financing it
which would render the scheme as a whole incompatible with a sin-
gle market and the common interest.253
248. Eden, supra note 246, at 633.
249. Case C-156/98, F.R.G. v. Commission, 2000 E.C.R. 1-6857.
According to Commission notice 96/C 68/06 on the de minimis rule for State aid (OJ
1996 C 68, p. 9, the de minimis notice), which amends the Community guidelines of 20
May 1992 on State aid for small and medium-sized enterprises as indicated in Commis-
sion notice 92/C 213/02 (OJ 1992 C 213, p. 2), Article 92(1) of the Treaty is to be consid-
ered as not applying to aid the amount of which is below the ceiling of ECU 100 000
over a three-year period beginning when the first de minimis aid is granted.
Id.
250. Id.
251. Eden, supra note 246, at 633.
252. Case 73/79, Commission v. Italy, 1980 E.C.R. 1533 (stating "the method of financing an
aid cannot be isolated from consideration of the aid properly so-called.").
253. Case 47/69, France v. Commission, 1970 E.C.R. 487.
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Unlike Art. 87, which is conditional,254 Art. 90 is unconditional.255 Ar-
ticle 87, alone, does not have direct effect.256 Article 90 can have di-
rect effect. 257 When a national tax only partly violates article 90 -
where for example the basis taxed is valid, but the tax rate discrimi-
nates between domestic and foreign entities taxed - whether the tax
will be partly enforced is for the national legislator to determine. 258
Partial enforcement of the tax would not be a contravention of Com-
munity law.
The objectives of principled economic liberalism were also upheld
in Pabst & Richarz KG v. Hauptzollamt Oldenberg.259 There, a tax
scheme was held in violation of the treaty where the tax was essen-
tially to further an anticompetitive monopoly. As a general rule, wher-
ever a tax impedes the formation of the single market we should
expect it will not be permitted.
C. Conventions to Avoid Double Taxation
The principle of avoiding double taxation is another liberal eco-
nomic view that finds its expression in the practice of EU law. Double
taxation, whether of income or of income sources, is bad economics
because double taxation just about always distorts market transac-
tions. Taxing a good increases its price reducing demand for that good,
and double taxing a good makes the good even less likely to be
bought.
Tax conventions, whether bilateral or multilateral, are the usual
method to avoid the double taxation that occurs when two different
governments claim to be able to tax the same source of income or the
same taxpayer.260 The OECD proposes model conventions which
have been taken up and enacted by numerous states.261
254. Case 78/76, Steinike & Weinlig v. Germany, 1977 E.C.R. 595 (stating "the prohibition in
Article 92 (1) is neither absolute nor unconditional since Article 92 (3) and Article 93 (2) give
the Commission a wide discretion and the Council extensive power to admit aids in derogation
from the general prohibition in Article 92 (1).").
255. See Case 27/67, Firma Fink-Frucht GmbH v Hauptzollamt Minchen Landsbergerstrasse,
1968 E.C.R. 327.
256. Case C-114/91, Criminal Proceedings Against G6rard Jer6me Claeys, 1992 E.C.R. 1-6559
(stating "[i]ndividuals cannot therefore simply, on the basis of Article 92 alone, challenge the
compatibility of an aid with Community law before the national courts or ask them to decide as
the main or a subsidiary issue on any incompatibility ... .
257. Id.
258. Case 34/67, Firma Gebruder Luck v. Hauptzollamt Koln-Rheinau, 1968 E.C.R. 359.
259. Case 17/81, 1982 E.C.R. 1331.
260. Devgun, supra note 59, at 451-470.
261. Id.
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Discriminatory taxation is sometimes challenged as a violation of
the right to establishment. Art. 43 (ex art. 52) of the EC Treaty (right
of establishment) is one of the basic freedoms of the EC Treaty and as
such has direct effect, creating rights and duties in and enforcable by
individuals.262
Where a Member State takes steps to prevent double taxation of
dividends the exoneration from double taxation the Member State
must also provide such exoneration for the branches of companies
from other Member States that are doing business in the Member
State in question. 263 Moreover, tax advantages provided to a company
of a Member State by that Member State as part of a double taxation
treaty with a non-Member State must also be provided to permanent
establishments in that Member State of companies of other Member
States.264
However, the obligations that the ECT imposes on Member States
do not normally affect the obligations of Member States to non-Mem-
ber States under treaties to avoid double taxation.265 Two Member
262. Case C-307/97, Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v. F'manzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, 1999
E.C.R. 1-6161.
263. Case 270/83, Commission v. France, 1986 E.C.R. 273 (stating that "by not granting to the
branches and agencies in France of insurance companies whose registered office is in another
Member State on the same terms as apply to insurance companies whose registered office is in
France the benefit of shareholders ' tax credits in respect of dividends paid to such branches or
agencies by french companies, the French Republic has failed to fulfil its obligations under Arti-
cle 52.").
264. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain, 1999 E.C.R. 1-6161.
Article 52 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 43 EC) and Article 58 of
the EC Treaty (now Article 48 EC) preclude the exclusion of a permanent establish-
ment in Germany of a company limited by shares having its seat in another Member
State from enjoyment, on the same conditions as those applicable to companies limited
by shares having their seat in Germany, of tax concessions taking the form of:
- an exemption from corporation tax for dividends received from companies estab-
lished in non-member countries (corporation tax relief for international groups), pro-
vided for by a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation concluded with a non-
member country,
- the crediting, against German corporation tax, of the corporation tax levied in a
State other than the Federal Republic of Germany on the profits of a subsidiary estab-
lished there, provided for by German legislation, and
- an exemption from capital tax for shareholdings in companies established in non-




[T]he obligations which Community law imposes on the Federal Republic of Germany
do not affect in any way those resulting from its agreements with the United States of
America and the Swiss Confederation. The balance and the reciprocity of the treaties
concluded by the Federal Republic of Germany with those two countries would not be
called into question by a unilateral extension, on the part of the Federal Republic of
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States can thus have differing policies as to third states. For example, a
German and French company could be taxed differently on their over-
seas operations in a non-Member State by the non Member State with
no conflict arising under EC law.
D. Directives
Our analysis of tax law Directives looks first at non-binding and then
at binding norms.
1. "Soft" Law
a. Code of Good Conduct
Non-binding codes of conduct are one more instrument that the EU
has which it uses to encourage harmonization of laws. For example,
the EU has proposed a non-binding Code of Conduct which was
signed by Finance Ministers at the ECOFIN Council meeting in 1997.
The objective of the Code of Conduct is to prevent a "race to the
bottom" 266 where each Member State lowers its taxation to attract
businesses with an attended reduction in social services and decline in
the quality of life. "[B]y signing the resolution, Member States commit
themselves not to introduce new harmful tax measures and to amend
existing harmful tax measures as soon as possible. '267 The Code is "a
political commitment and does not affect the Member States' rights
and obligations or the respective spheres on competence of the Mem-
ber States and the Community arising from the Treaty".2 68 That is, the
Code is a non-binding resolution. However "if Member States do not
take action to remove the provisions identified as harmful, the Com-
mission may be prepared to use Article 96 of the Treaty to propose a
Directive to the Council, who may then act on a qualified
majority."2 69
Germany, of the category of recipients in Germany of the tax advantage provided for
by those treaties, in this case corporation tax relief for international groups, since such
an extension would not in any way affect the rights of the non-member countries which
are parties to the treaties and would not impose any new obligation on them.
Id.
266. For a good description of the development of the idea of a race to the bottom due to
regulatory competition in the U.S. as a basis for a comparitive analysis of EU law, see Catherine
Hoist, Note, European Company Law After Centros: Is the EU on the Road to Delaware? 8
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 323, 332 (2002).
267. Eden, supra note 246, at 633.
268. Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States On a Code of Conduct for Business Taxation, 1998 O.J. (C 002) 2, available at http://
europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uricELEX:41998X0106:EN:NOT.
269. Eden, supra note 246, at 633.
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b. Mutual Assistance Directive
Like the Code of Conduct, the Mutual Assistance Directive 270 pro-
vides a cadre in which Member States taxing authorities can exchange
information in order to combat tax fraud.271 These soft law provisions




Mergers and acquisitions of companies almost always raise tax is-
sues because the sale of stock involved technically is a realization
event. The merger Directive defers taxation of capital gains of prop-
erty transferred pursuant to "mergers, divisions, transfers of assets
and exchanges of shares" where the assets are still taxable by that
jurisdiction. Professor Sandra Eden provides an exemplary illustration
of the type of problem the Merger Directive addresses:
company A, a manufacturing company in the United Kingdom, de-
cides to tranfer all its operations in Newcastle to company B in Ger-
many in exchange for shares in B. There will be no charge to tax on
the disposal of the assets to B, because the assets will be attached to
a permanent establishment of B's in the United Kingdom, and so
will remain within the United Kingdom tax charge. The deferred
gain will be caught when B disposes of the assets.2
73
Essentially, the taxation of the realized gain or loss in the transaction
is deferred because the taxable basis was not transferred outside the
tax jurisdiction of the Member State and because such corporate
restructurings would be disfavored were the gain or loss immediately
recognized. The basis of the capital good is transferred to its new
owner and will serve as the starting point to determine tax when the
good if finally alienated. This deferral of taxation in order to permit
flexible restructuring is one more example of the principle of eco-
nomic neutrality of taxation guiding community tax law.
270. Council Directive 77/799, 1977 O.J. (L 336) 15 (EEC).
271. Eden, supra note 246, at 628.
272. Council Directive 90/434, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 1 (EEC), amended by Council Directive
2005/19/EC, 2005 O.J. (L 058) 19.
273. Eden, supra note 246, at 630.
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b. Parent Subsidiary Directive
The Parent Subsidiary Directive2 74 is very similar to the merger Di-
rective. The goal of both Directives is to allow enterprises to flexibly
reorganize their operations without being influenced by tax considera-
tions. The objective of the Parent Subsidiary Directive is "to exempt
dividends and other profit distributions paid by subsidiary companies
to their parent companies from withholding taxes and to eliminate
double taxation of such income at the level of the parent company". 275
The Directives exempt cross-border dividend payments from with-
holding taxes where such dividends are paid within a corporate group:
Member states can either exempt the dividend or provide an
equivalent tax credit. There must be at least 25% control of the com-
pany in question by the parent and both the company paying and the
company receiving the dividend must be fiscal residents of Member
States. 276
D. Cases: Futura, Marks and Spencer, and the Principle
of Territoriality
Internationally, it is generally admitted that residents are taxable
for their income regardless of its source, but non-residents are taxable
only on income sourced to the taxing jurisdiction. Thus, in principle
residents and non-residents can be taxed differently under the EC
Treaty.277 However this theoretical starting point does not really de-
cide the issue. The goal of building a single market, the right to free
movement of persons, and the attendant duty to avoid discriminatory
treatment, whether in terms of taxation or services leads the court to
analyze tax liabilities in terms of the practical facts on a case by case
basis.278 One example of this is the Futura Participations SA v. Admin-
istration des Contributions 279 decision.
1. Futura
The question presented in Futura was whether a Member State can
limit the right of a permanent establishment (corporate headquarters)
274. Council Directive 90/435, 1990 O.J. (L 225) 6 (EEC), amended by Council Directive
2003/123 , 2004 O.J. (L 7) 41 (EC).
275. Council Directive 2003/123, 2004 O.J. (L 7) 41, 41 (EC).
276. Eden, supra note 246, at 628.
277. See Case 270/83, Commission v. Fr., 1986 E.C.R. 273; Case C-279/93, Finanzant Koln-
Altstadt v. Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225; Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der Directe
Belastingen, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2493; Case C-311/97, Royal Bank of Scot. v. Elliniko Dimosio, 1999
E.C.R. 1-2651
278. See generally Eden, supra note 246.
279. Case C-250/95, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2471.
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to offset gains with losses only for losses which were realized in that
Member State.280 Of course, while "direct taxation falls within the
competence of the Member States, the latter must none the less exer-
cise that competence consistently with Community law and therefore
avoid any overt or covert discrimination on grounds of nationality" 281
That is, the court looks beyond discriminatory intent and considers
also discriminatory effect as a basis for breach of treaty obligations. 282
Even though "direct taxation does not as such fall within the purview
of the Community... , the powers retained by the Member States
must nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community law". 283
Thus, a law which has the effect of discrimination on the basis of na-
tionality is in principle contrary to the EC Treaty. This is obviously
consistent with the goal of the EU (a single market for labor, capital,
and goods) and its teleology (economic liberalism in the service of
peace and prosperity).
Yet, in Futura the court pointed out the power of the Member
States to tax: "effectiveness of fiscal supervision constitutes an over-
riding requirement of general interest capable of justifying a restric-
tion on the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the
Treaty" 2 4 The court did not need to affirm the power of the Member
State to derogate from its treaty obligations to reach the economically
neutral liberal result, yet did so. Moreover, though the court already
280. Id. The operant portion of the case states very precisely the issue of offsetting gains and
losses:
Article 52 of the Treaty does not preclude a Member State from making the carrying
forward of previous losses, requested by a taxpayer which has a branch in its territory
but is not resident there, subject to the condition that the losses must be economically
related to the income earned by the taxpayer in that State, provided that resident tax-
payers do not receive more favourable treatment. On the other hand, that article does
preclude the carrying forward of losses from being made subject to the condition that,
in the year in which the losses were incurred, the taxpayer must have kept and held in
that State accounts relating to his activities carried on there which comply with the
relevant national rules. The Member State concerned may, however, require the non-
resident taxpayer to demonstrate clearly and precisely that the amount of the losses
which he claims to have incurred corresponds, under its domestic rules governing the
calculation of income and losses which were applicable in the financial year concerned,
to the amount of the losses actually incurred in that State by the taxpayer.
Id.
281. Id. (citing Schumacker, 1995 E.C.R. 1-225 and Wielock-x, 1995 E.C.R. 1-2493).
282. Case C-1/93, Halliburton Servs. BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financien, 1994 E.C.R. 1-1137.
."[T]he rules regarding equality of treatment forbid not only overt discrimination by reason of
nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat, but all covert forms of discrimination which, by
the application of other criteria of differentiation, lead in fact to the same result." Id. (citing
Case C-330/91, The Queen v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte Commerzbank, 1993
E.C.R. 1-4017).
283. C-55/98, Skatteministeriet v. Bent Vestergaard, 1999 E.C.R. 1-7641.
284. Futura Participations SA, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2471.
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had enough reasons to decide the issue in favor of the single market/
economic liberalism, it went on, unnecessarily, to justify its decision
on the basis of the principle of fiscal territoriality. 285 This is the inter-
esting part of the decision. First, it was just as much surplusage as the
statements on the ability of Member States to derogate from their
treaty obligations in the interest of orderly taxation. Moreover, the
principle of territoriality presents a counterbalance to the power of
the Member State to derogate from the treaty. Member State taxation
may only derogate from the treaty if such derogation is consistent with
the principle of fiscal territoriality.
The principle of territoriality is a general principle of international
law and of community law,2 86 if only because the EC and EU treaties
are treaties under international law and subject thereto. The principle
of territoriality states that a taxing jurisdiction may tax income
sourced from that jurisdiction, and that the taxing jurisdiction has an
absolute right to tax its nationals.287 By establishing these concurring
norms - the right of Member States to derogate from the treaty, but
subject to the principle of territoriality - the court allows itself in fu-
ture decisions to justify any outcome it wants to.
2. Steinike
The court in Steinike was confronted by a state aid offered by Ger-
many to aid German food processing companies to open new domes-
tic and foreign markets.288 The Commission had been informed of the
aid and had not objected.289 The German food processors received the
aid regardless of the origin of the food to be processed. 290 The court
noted prohibition in ex Art. 92 are not absolute but are conditional291
285. Id. "Such a system, which is in conformity with the fiscal principle of territoriality, cannot
be regarded as entailing any discrimination, overt or covert, prohibited by the Treaty." Id.
286. Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer PLC v. Halsey (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes), 2005
E.C.R. 00.
287. Id.
In accordance with the principle of territoriality applicable both in international law
and in Community law, the Member State in which the parent company is established
has no tax jurisdiction over non-resident subsidiaries. As regards the latter, tax compe-
tence belongs in principle, in accordance with the usual allocation of competence in
such matters, to the States on whose territory they are established and carry out com-
mercial activities.
Id.
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and then went on to do a multifactor balancing test.292 Interestingly,
the court did make clear that a state aid cannot at once be a tax under
article 90 (ex article 95) and a charge having equivalent effect to a
customs duty under former articles 9,12 and 13.293
3. Marks and Spencer294
A British company, with several subsidiaries also incorporated in
Britain and other Member States, divested itself of its foreign estab-
lishments.295 Britain allowed tax transparency between British compa-
nies, whether doing business in Britain or overseas, but did not allow
tax transparancy between subsidiaries owned by British companies
but incorporated in other Member States. 296 Essentially, dividend pay-
ments from the foreign subsidiary to the British parent company were
not taxed if the subsidiary was incorporated in Britain but would be
taxed if the company were set up under the laws of another Member
State.297 Losses would also be allowed to offset gains within the corpo-
rate group, but only as to companies incorporated under British
law.298 This presented a case of differential taxation. The question was
whether the tax preference was a violation of the right of establish-
ment under former articles 43 and 48 (now articles 37 and 39).299 The
court decided that while in theory such differential tax treatment
might under certain circumstances be permissible, namely (at least)
where there is the opportunity for the foreign subsidiary to offset the
double taxation in the tax system of the other Member State.300
Where the foreign subsidiary has however exhausted all opportunities
to avoid the double taxation, such differential taxation would be a vio-
lation of the EC Treaty.30 1 The court did make clear that not only the
tax credit to avoid double taxation of dividend income but also loss
deductions (including carry forwards) would enter its considerations
as to whether the theoretically permissible differential taxation would
292. Id. "In judging in these cases whether state aid is compatible with the common market
complex economic factors subject to rapid change must be taken into account and assessed.
Article 93 of the Treaty therefore provides for a special procedure whereby the Commission
shall keep aid under constant review." Id.
293. Steinike, 1977 E.C.R. 595.
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be also allowed in the specific case at bar. Though the court does not
expressly invoke the doctrine of fiscal realism in practice it does so in
this case.
4. Synthesis
In Futura, Marks and Spencer, and Steinike,302 the court clearly
takes a realist approach: It is not interested in legal formalities or
whether the black letter law was observed. Rather it looks to a num-
ber of factors 30 3 to reach a balanced decision on a case by case ba-
sis. 30 4 In all these cases the court is leaving itself openings, both in
noting the power of Member States to tax more or less as they see fit,
and in describing the principle of territoriality so that it can justify
whatever result it feels necessary to achieve the single market. The
court gives in to the Member States whenever absolutely necessary,
yet advancing the process of legal integration whenever possible.
III. EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW: THE RIGHT OF ESTABLISHMENT
AND THE SOCIETAs EUROPA
A. National Law: Real Seat Theory of Corporate Nationality v.
Place of Incorporation Theory of Corporate Nationality
The citizenship and residence of companies are treated very differ-
ently in common law as opposed to the civil law. This fact marks EU
business law and must be explained if we are to understand EU law.
Most common law jurisdictions adhere to the "incorporation the-
ory" - a corporation is deemed to be the creature of the state where it
is incorporated, regardless of where it does business. The internal af-
fairs of the corporation are governed by the laws of the place of incor-
poration, even when it does business outside of that state. The
advantages of the place of incorporation theory is that it allows the
company to move without being obliged to dissolve itself and
reincorporate. The place of incorporation theory also allows manage-
ment to forum shop. It is also a rule of easy and certain application, a
type of bright line test.
302. "[W]hether state aid is compatible with the common market complex economic factors
subject to rapid change must be taken into account and assessed." Case 78/76, Steinike & Wein-
lig v. F.R.G., 1977 E.C.R. 595.
303. "In each specific situation, it is necessary to consider whether the fact that a tax advan-
tage is available solely to resident taxpayers is based on relevant objective elements apt to justify
the difference in treatment."
Marks & Spencer, 2005 E.C.R. 00.
304. "[I]n tax law, the taxpayers' residence may constitute a factor that might justify national
rules involving different treatment for resident and non-resident taxpayers. However, residence
is not always a proper factor for distinction." Marks & Spencer, 2005 E.C.R. 00.
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Though some civilian jurisdictions such as the Netherlands and
Switzerland do take up the place of incorporation theory, France and
Germany among others do not. Most continental civilian jurisdictions
takes a different view from the "incorporation theory" and instead use
the "real seat theory" (Sitztheorie) to determine residency. The "real
seat theory" holds that the corporation is a citizen of the state where it
has its headquarters, i.e. does business. The corporation is obliged to
register or incorporate where it has its headquarters or it will be de-
nied legal personality. This rule makes it easier for host states to con-
trol foreign corporations but makes it difficult for the corporation to
move since dissolution and reincorporation would be required to do
so. This theory prevents forum shopping.
Both rules exist in the EU today. A Directive could force Member
States to adopt one or the other theory. However none exists or is
proposed. In fact "the 'place of incorporation' doctrine coexists best
with the goal of a single European market because it recognizes for-
eign companies and the laws that govern their internal affairs and it
allows companies to move to a new state.305
Understanding the differences between these two regulatory sys-
tems is essential for understanding the conflicts arising out of the right
of establishment.
B. The Case Law of the Right of Establishment: Daily Mail,
Centros, Uberseering and Futura
1. Daily Mail
It is well settled that any enterprise incorporated in the EU has in
principle the right to do business anywhere in the Union. The right of
establishment is central to the single market and one of the four basic
rights guarantied by the ECT. However, this nearly absolute right in
principle is not without problems in practice.
An early leading case on the right of establishment is Daily Mail.30 6
A British company wished to transfer its head office from England to
the Netherlands to take advantage of a more favorable Dutch taxation
system. 307 That move required prior approval of the tax authorities. 30 8
The required approval was not forthcoming. 30 9
305. Gildea, supra note 1, at 292.
306. Case 81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Comm'r of Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily
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One might think that the ECJ could have rejected this move as an
example of tax evasion resulting from manipulation of law - abus de
droit. Or, one could imagine the court saying that such a move would
be illegal by invoking a doctrine of fiscal realism. It is clearly a general
principle of tax law that tax authorities, whether in France or the
United States, look not to the form of a transaction but at its sub-
stance to determine its effects. And general principles of law are a
source of law, both in international law310 and in EU law.31 ' Yet, the
court did not take these obvious doctrinal moves, neither in Daily
Mail, nor in its progeny (Centros, Cberseering, Futura)! Rather, the
court limited itself to an examination of the EC Treaty. But, the court
did not follow the obvious teleology of the treaty. It did not determine
that the right of establishment should permit the British company to
establish its head office in the Netherlands. Rationales for such a deci-
sion could be to encourage integration of the single market and even
to encourage regulatory competition among the Member States. In-
stead, the court determined that the right of establishment did not
permit the company incorporated in one Member State to move its
head office to another Member State,312 at least not where such move
was motivated by tax avoidance purposes (and we must remember,
tax avoidance is not per se tax fraud). The reasoning of the court is
that the EC Treaty does not adopt either the real seat theory or the
place of incorporation theory. Thus, the issue was left for national law
to determine, and Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty of Rome do not
give companies an absolute right to transfer their head office.31 3
310. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993. In fact however the foundation of general principles of law has a source of international
law natural law. Aaron Judson Lodge, Globalization: Panacea For The World or Conquistador
Of International Law and Statehood?, 7 OR. REV. INr'L L. 224, 292 (2005); Jon M. Van Dyke,
The Role of Customary International Law in Federal and State Court Litigation, 26 U. HAW. L.
REV. 361, 381 n. 123 (2004) (citing Grotius); Joel Brandon Moore, The Natural Law Basis Of
Legal Obligation: International Antitrust and OPEC in Context, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 243,
273-275 (2003). This is because: (1) the ICJ is a creature of treaty, not custom. As such, states
may choose not to be bound by its decisions; (2) its decisions do not have value as precedent;
and (3) general principles of law were a source of law long before the ICJ was constituted. Thus,
general principles of law may be a source of law due to custom, for they are the customary
interpretations of law done by states.
311. See, e.g., Case T-83/96, van der Wal v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 11-545 (stating "[i]t is
settled case-law that fundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles of law
whose observance the Community judicature ensures...").
312. Case C-208/00, Uberseering BV v. Nordic Consruction Co. Baumanagement GmbH,
2002 E.C.R. 1-9919.
313. Hoist, supra note 266, at 328.
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2. Centros
After Daily Mail an observer might think that the ECJ would see
through attempts to manipulate the tax system and not allow the EC
Treaty to be invoked to further such schemes, applying a sort of "fiscal
realism by other means". In fact however that has not proven to be
the case as seen first in Centros Ltd v. Erhvervs og
Selskabsstyrelsen.314
The facts of Centros are as follows: Residents of Denmark wished to
incorporate a "shell" company in the UK and to then use that com-
pany to conduct business in Denmark. No business was to be trans-
acted in the UK. Clearly then this was an example of abusing the legal
system to obtain a pecuniary result. Namely, the avoidance of Danish
rules requiring all companies to have a minimum of capital prior to
incorporation. The risk claimed by Denmark was that such manipula-
tion places creditors at risk. Yet, despite Daily Mail, the ECJ held that
Denmark was required to recognize the formally "foreign" company
and allow it to do business in Denmark. Like Netherlands and the
UK, Denmark follows the incorporation theory of corporate
residence. 315
The best justification of Centros would be a reductio ad absurdam.
If Denmark were allowed not to recognize the formally British com-
pany what about other companies? Would a company owned by
French nationals incorporated in Britain be able to do business in
Denmark? A similar justification would be the idea that each Member
State must essentially give full faith and credit to the legal acts of the
other Member States. But why should those rationales be permitted to
justify an abuse of the law through manipulation to disguise
transactions?
The court does in fact recognize both the possibility of legal manip-
ulation and the right of Member States to prevent abuse of commu-
nity law at least by its own citizens. 316 However, measures which
restrict the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty must be "applied in a
non-discriminatory manner; they must be justified by imperative re-
quirements in the general interest; they must be suitable for securing
the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must not
314. Case C-212/97, 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459.
315. Hoist, supra note 266, at 323.
316. Centros Ltd., 1999 E.C.R. 1-1459 (stating "[i]t is true that according to the case-law of the
Court a Member State is entitled to take measures designed to prevent certain of its nationals
from attempting, undercover of the rights created by the Treaty, improperly to circumvent their
national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or fraudulently taking advantage
of provisions of Community law .... ).
2006]
396 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it".317 In Centros, this
was not the case, since the end, protection of creditors, would not
have been met by the means as to British companies incorporated by
Britons.318 There were less restrictive means to the legitimate end
sought by the Danish government. 319 To an American lawyer, this
looks a lot like means-ends constitutional review.320
3. (lUberseering
After Centros and Daily Mail the community law seemed at odds
with itself. The situation was clarified, somewhat, in the tberseering
decision. The facts of (berseering are as follows: A company was in-
corporated in the Netherlands. It is owned by German nationals, but
not registered as a German company. Can that company go before
German courts? German law follows the real seat theory (Sitztheorie).
Since the ostensibly Dutch company was not registerered in Germany,
which was the place of the center of its economic interests (the place
where it has its administration or headquarters) Germany considered
that the entity was subject to German law. As it was not properly
registered it had no legal existence under German law. The problem is
that this amounts to non-recognition of a foreign company, and thus
might be a breach of the EC Treaty.
So the question is, whether Uberseering is more like Daily Mail, or
more like Centros? Or is it sui generis? In tlberseering there was no
attempt at manipulation of law or of tax avoidance. So there may in
fact be no analogy between Uberseering on the one hand and Daily
Mail or Centros on the other. Nevertheless, the court and analysts
seems to consider the cases as somehow related: They all concern the
rights of foreign establishments, and legal fictions. But the legal fiction
in Uberseering is invoked by the state (denying the factual existence of
the company) whereas the legal fiction invoked in Centros and Daily
Mail is invoked by the individual. So Uberseering on the one hand and
Centros and Daily Mail on the other are not in fact analogous.
In any event, the ECJ in tiberseering required legal fictions to re-
semble practical facts. Germany was forced to recognize the existence
of the formally Dutch company under Articles 43 and 48 of the Treaty
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the permissible end of protecting creditors.321 The German measure
was not proportional. 322 Moreover, the German ruling denied the
company its fundamental right to establishment, 323 the right to a fair
hearing324 and possibly the right to own property.325 However, the
ECJ did not appear to consider the disturbing fact that it attributed
fundamental human rights to a non-human!
The court's decision would support an analogy of lUberseering to
Centros rather than to Daily Mail because Centros, like tberseering,
addressed the relation of a host state and a corporation.326 The ECJ
distinguished Daily Mail from (berseering because Daily Mail "con-
cerned relations between a company and the Member State under
whose laws it had been incorporated" while "the present case con-
cerns the recognition by one Member State of a company incorpo-
rated under the law of another Member State. ' 327 That is, (berseering
involved not the right of a company to move outside of the state it
incorporated in, but rather whether a company has a right to recogni-
tion in a host state.328 This implies perhaps that a company could com-
pel recognition in a "real seat theory" Member State by incorporating
in an "incorporation theory" Member State, but only possibly, since
Uberseering clearly involved no element of fraud or other abuse of the
law. However the facts of Uberseering are sufficiently different from
Centros and Daily Mail such that one can question whether any anal-
ogy at all should be found.
Whatever we think about the fact that Uberseering tries, unsucces-
fully, to defuse the conflict between Centros and Daily mail by forcing
an analogy that is really not there the fact is: Uberseering sends a clear
message that ambiguities will be resolved in favor of the Community
and the single market. '329
C. Regulation: The Societas Europa330
The Societas Europa (SE) is an attempt to overcome the problem
that there are two differing theories of corporate residency. It is also
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an attempt to create a European company form. How does one form
an SE? What are its advantages?
1. Definition of the SE
The SE is business corporation with legal personality. The SE must
be registered in one of the Member States, and its place of registration
must also be the seat of its headquarters. SE's face a minimum capital-
ization requirement of 120,000 euros. 331 Liability of sharholders is lim-
ited to the value of their investment.332 The SE is subject to the same
formalities of registration, reporting, and internal governance that are
found in similar national laws.
2. Formation of the Societas Europa
SE's are created by merger of national corporations (e.g., SA,
GmbH, AG, PLC), whether as equals, holdings, or subsidiaries, where
at least two of the merged companies are from different Member
States;333 The SE cannot be created from scratch, rather only through
merger of existing companies from two or more Member States.
3. Advantages and Limits of the SE
The advantage of the SE is that it is easier for an SE in a real seat
theory state to transfer its registered office from one Member State to
another.334 Transfer of the head office does not require dissolution
and reincorporation. 335 Thus the SE is adapted to solving the problem
of real seat theory states.336 The SE is intended to reduce administra-
tive and transaction costs to help build a single efficient market to
benefit all Europeans. It should reduce administrative and transaction
costs by an estimated 30 Billion euros. 337
Some do question whether harmonization efforts lead to lower
transaction costs. 338 The better answer is a qualified yes. Of course,
greater legal certainty, lower transaction costs, and more transparancy
are always possible. However the question is not whether the efforts
at integration reach the very best result possible in theory. Rather the
331. Id. at 4.
332. Andreas Kellerhals & Dirk Triiten, The Creation of the European Company, 17 TUL.
EUR. & CIV. L.F. 71, 76 (2002).
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question is whether they achieve better results than an unharmonized
system. And the answer to that question is clearly yes.
IV. CONCLUSION
Directives, regulations, case law and conventions together form a
body of binding EU business law. Such laws are inevitable, and inevi-
tably evolving, as the Community grows into a Union and federation.
These laws foster peace by creating the conditions for liberal trade
and attendant prosperity. These developments are hopeful as they will
make the world more wealthy and thus make conflict less likely.
Rather than viewing the EU with fear, U.S. policy makers should see
that the challenge the EU represents is also an opportunity.
I
